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Summary 
We use an experimental auction market to investigate how inconsistency in tenderness affects 
consumers’ WTP for beef.  We find that both the level and the spread of tenderness affect 
consumers’ WTP.  Categorization the beef into various classes of tenderness increased the total 
value of the beef by 8%. 
 
JEL: C91, D12, D8, Q13. 
Key words: beef tenderness, consumer demand, experimental auction, marketing, risk aversion. 
 
Risk preferences are important for consumers’ choices in food markets, and several studies have 
already investigated consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for food products associated with risk. 
These studies focus on either high stake but low probability risk, such as potential 
microbiological hazards resulting in illness or death (e.g., Hayes et al.; Fox et al.; Fox, Hayes, 
and Shogren), or food products that some consumers fear represent an unknown risk, such as 
genetically modified foods (e.g., Lusk; James and Burton) or hormone-treated beef (e.g., Alfnes; 
Alfnes and Rickertsen). The focus of this paper is risk aversion in consumer food markets with 
low stake but high probability risk. Consumers are exposed to this type of risk in the form of 
inconsistent quality attributes in food products. The probability of buying a tough steak is 
relatively high, for instance, but the negative consequences are generally less severe; a tough 
steak will not kill you, but it can ruin your dinner. 
Holt and Laury investigated peoples’ attitudes toward risk using lottery choices and found 
that risk aversion plays an important role in low, as well as high, stake choices. Their results 
indicate that risk aversion can plays an important role in the low stake choices food buyers make. 
However, a number of studies have found that risk preferences elicited in one context cannot be  
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directly transferred another (e.g., Hudson, Coble, and Lusk; Hershey, Kunreuther, and 
Schoemaker). The importance of risk aversion in consumer markets then remains a largely 
unanswered empirical question. 
Low stake and high probability risk is typical for unprocessed or semi-processed food 
products with inconsistent quality attributes. Producers of processed foods use a variety of quality 
control methods to ensure that products within a particular category have no, or barely any, 
detectable differences in important attributes. For unprocessed or semi-processed foods, quality 
control may include non-invasive techniques or the use of test samples, but these methods are 
often insufficient to accurately predict the quality of a batch because of the large biological 
diversity of natural produce. For example, two apparently similar cuts of beef can differ 
significantly in tenderness because of factors such as the animal' s age, breed, gender, and stress 
level, and the tenderizing process employed. Thus, consumers are subject to much higher 
variability in the sensory experience when buying unprocessed or semi-processed foods, such as 
meat, fish, fruits, and vegetables, than when buying processed foods. 
Tenderness is the primary determinant of satisfaction among beef consumers (Dransfield, 
Zamora, and Bayle; Sivertsen, Kubberød, and Hildrum), and inconsistent or inadequate 
tenderness are the top two beef-quality concerns for U.S. purveyors, restaurateurs, and retailers 
(National Beef Quality Audit). There are several studies of consumer preferences for beef 
tenderness. Acebron and Dopico investigated how consumers form in-store expectations about 
beef quality; Lusk et al. (2001) used experimental methods to examine consumer WTP for steak 
tenderness in a grocery store setting; and Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder used several types of 
experimental auctions to elicit WTP for quality differentiated beef steaks. The results of these 
studies indicate that most consumers prefer tender beef and that many are willing to pay a 
premium for a guarantee of tenderness. However, none of these studies explored the effect of  
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inconsistent tenderness on consumer WTP for beef. If, and as is hypothesized, consumers are risk 
averse, part of the premium paid for guaranteed tender beef may be due to the difference in 
tenderness variability between generic and guaranteed tender beef. 
Market experiments with carefully controlled products, probabilities, and payoffs can be 
used to investigate consumers’ WTP for various products and the importance of risk aversion in 
choices among products. There are several experimental methods for eliciting individual risk 
preferences; see Wakker and Deneffe for a discussion of risk preference elicitation methods. A 
common method is to elicit the WTP for risky prospects. The lower the WTP is relative to the 
expected value of the prospect, the higher the level of risk aversion (e.g., Harrison; Kachelmeier 
and Shehata; Pennings and Garcia). 
We investigate how inconsistency in beef tenderness affects consumers’ valuations by 
using an experimental auction to elicit consumers’ valuation of beef in three tenderness 
categories as well as uncategorized generic beef. Given the known tenderness distribution of the 
generic beef, we calculate the ratio between the WTP for the generic beef and the expected value 
of the generic beef for each auction participant. The lower this risk ratio, the more risk averse the 
participant. The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we show how lottery theory and 
experimental auctions can be used to study the effect of quality inconsistency on consumers’ 
WTP for food products. Second, the effects of inconsistent beef tenderness on consumers’ WTP 
for beef have not been studied in the past and we fill this empirical gap in the literature. 
 
Experiment and Auction Design 
In November 2003, we established a market experiment at the Norwegian Food Research 
Institute. We conducted four sessions with each session lasting approximately 90 minutes. Fifty-
one participants were recruited through local organizations, including choirs and soccer teams, in  
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southeastern Norway.
1 In each organization, the contact person was instructed to provide a 
sample of regular consumers of beef, between 25 and 60 years old, with an approximately equal 
division of sexes. Each participant was paid NOK 300
2 to participate. In addition, NOK 200 was 
paid to the recruiting organization for each participant who completed the experiment. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the participants. The participants’ age ranged 
from 23 to 59 years, with an average of 38 years. Fifty-one percent were female. The average 
household income was NOK 531,000 and 55% had at least some university level education. The 
sample chosen is representative for the age group in the region. 
We obtained 120 kilograms of beef sirloin from Norsk Kjøtt, Norway’s largest meat 
processing company. The quality of the beef reflected the variation in quality found in local 
stores. The beef was produced on two consecutive days, vacuum-packed as whole loins, and 
stored for tenderizing for 14 days. The loins were then numbered from one to 48, cut into 1.5 cm 
slices, partitioned into portions weighing approximately 400 grams, and packed in consumer 
packages in a modified atmosphere similar to that found in Norwegian meatpacking. 
Neither consumers nor experts can determine the tenderness of beef by visual inspection, 
and two cuts with the same marbling classification, for example U.S. select strip loin, can differ 
significantly in tenderness (Miller et al.). We used the Warner-Bratzler Shear Force (WB) test to 
measure tenderness (Boleman et al.). The WB test measures the amount of force required to 
penetrate a cut of meat: the lower the force required the more tender the meat. Consumer 
preferences regarding beef with various WB scores have been investigated in several papers 
(Boleman et al.; Sivertsen, Kubberød, and Hildrum; and Huffman et al.). Sivertsen, Kubberød, 
and Hildrum, for example, concluded that WB test results are highly correlated with consumer 
ratings of tenderness with a sample correlation coefficient of –0.87.  
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The WB test was used to categorize the beef into three tenderness categories: very tender, 
tender, and less tender. This categorization was based on the measured distribution of the WB 
scores in the sample, i.e., the relative tenderness of the beef. Accordingly, the lowest 25% of WB 
scores in the sample were categorized as very tender, the next 50% as tender, and the remaining 
25% as less tender. 
Based on these tenderness categories, we created four qualities of beef: A, B, C, and V. 
Quality A was very tender, quality B tender, quality C less tender, and quality V uncategorized 
generic beef. In the experiments, we emphasized that quality V beef could be very tender, tender, 
or less tender and, furthermore, that the distribution of tenderness in quality V reflected the 
variation in the total beef sample, i.e., 25% very tender, 50% tender, and 25% less tender. Figure 
1 was used to explain the tenderness variation of the four qualities. The participants were also 
shown samples to demonstrate that the various qualities did not differ in their visible attributes. 
Several studies have used uniform fourth- or fifth-price auction to elicit WTP (e.g., 
Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze, Umberger and Feuz). Compared with the frequently used second-
price auction the uniform fourth- (and fifth-) price auction has several benefits. First, a fourth-
price auction will have a smaller difference between the average participant’s valuation of the 
product and the price. Therefore, a bid that differs from a participant’s WTP is more likely to 
have real economic consequences. Second, with multiple winners it is not as exclusive to win the 
auction and any auction winning utilities not associated with the product are reduced. Third, 
extreme outliers are less likely to affect the price information that the participants receive during 
the experiment. As the second-price sealed-bid auction, the uniform fourth-price sealed-bid 
auction is an incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting WTP (Vickrey). Bidding your WTP is 
then a weakly dominant strategy. Bidding more than your WTP gives a positive probability of 
winning when the price is higher than your valuation of the product. Bidding less than your WTP  
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decreases the probability of winning when the price is less than the valuation (Shogren et al., 
1994b). 
We used a uniform fourth-price sealed-bid auction. In this type of auction, the participants 
submit sealed bids, the fourth-highest bid is the price, and the participants bidding higher than 
that price are the buyers. The participants were asked to bid simultaneously on the four qualities 
of beef. We started by explaining to the participants the auction procedure. Next, we conducted 
two hypothetical auction trials to familiarize the participants with the principles of the fourth-
price sealed-bid auction. In these hypothetical trials, no real purchases were made. The 
participants were told explicitly that these trials were training trials that were to be followed by 
real trials. We then conducted four trials of non-hypothetical fourth-price sealed-bid auctions. We 
used multiple trials to make it possible to conduct within sample comparison of bids before and 
after introducing real economic incentives, before and after tasting the different qualities, and to 
allow the participants to refine their bids to more accurately reflect their own valuation. After 
each trial, the price for each quality and the identification number of the winning bidders were 
written on a whiteboard. After the four trials were completed, we randomly chose one binding 
trial and one binding quality. The participants with higher bids than the price for the binding 
quality in the binding trial were the buyers.
 
After two hypothetical and two real trials of bidding, the participants were allowed to taste 
samples of the different qualities. We informed the participants that we had randomly drawn one 
loin from each quality and that these loins were not necessarily representative of the respective 
qualities, but rather were examples on beef within the different qualities. We randomly drew one 
loin from each quality, sliced the loins into steaks, and grilled the steaks on both sides until the 
core temperature reached 60°C. Each steak was cut into small wedge shaped pieces, placed on 
white plastic dishes, and labeled with one of the letters A, B, C, or V depending on the quality.  
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The same four loins were used in all four sessions. The loin drawn to represent V had a WB score 




The four qualities, A, B, C, and V, may be looked upon as lotteries, LA, LB, LC, and LV, where the 
outcome of each lottery is the tenderness of the beef. By segmenting the beef into tenderness 
categories, we have reduced but not eliminated the variability in tenderness for quality A, B, and 
C. The participants assign subjective probabilities for various tenderness outcomes for each of the 
four qualities. These subjective probabilities vary between the participants, and are based on the 
individual participant’s experience and judgment. We have no information about the probabilities 
that the participants assign to the various tenderness outcomes within each quality, and neither do 
we have any information on their valuation on the various tenderness outcomes within each 
quality. 
Each of the qualities A, B, and C may be viewed as a simple lottery, Lk, with k = A, B, C 
and where the outcome of each lottery is the tenderness of the beef, t = 1,...,T. Each simple lottery 
is a list 1 ( ,..., )
k k
k T L p p = with  0
k
t p ³  "t and  1,
k
t t p = ￿ where 
k
t p is the probability of tenderness t 
occurring in lottery k. 
Quality V can be viewed as a simple lottery or as a compound lottery. A compound 
lottery, L
C, is the risky alternative that yields the simple lottery Lk with probability ak. Quality V 
may be described as a compound lottery of the simple lotteries A, B, and C or 
V A B C A B C ( , , ; , , )
C L L L L a a a =  with  0 k a ³ "k and  1 k ka = ￿ . The compound lottery  V
C L can be 
reduced to the simple lottery
V V
V 1 ( ,..., ) T L p p = , with the same ultimate distribution of tenderness 
probabilities. That is, the probability of outcome t in the reduced lottery is  
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A B C
A B C .
V
t t t t p p p p a a a = + +  Whether the probabilities of various outcomes arise as a result of a 
simple lottery or of a more complex compound lottery has no significance, i.e., the simple lottery 
LV is equally good as the compound lottery  V A B C = ( , , ;0.25,0.50,0.25)
C L L L L . 
  Assuming that a participant’s preferences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function, the expected utility of the simple lottery LV, EU(LV), is 
(1)    V V A B C ( ) ( ) 0.25 ( ) 0.50 ( ) 0.25 ( ).
C EU L EU L U L U L U L = = × + × + ×  
The first equality states that the simple lottery is equally good as the compound lottery and the 
second equality states that the expected utility is equal to the weighted average of the utilities of 
the simple lotteries LA, LB, and LC with the probabilities of these lotteries as weights. 
The certainty equivalent of a lottery, CE(L), is the amount of money obtained with 
certainty that gives the same expected utility as the lottery. In an incentive compatible auction, a 
participant’s bid for a lottery equals his or her CE of the lottery, or 
(2)    ( ) ( ). k Bid k CE L =  
The expected value of a lottery is the weighted average of the monetary values associated 
with the possible outcomes using the probability of each outcome as weights. In our case, the 
expected value of quality V,  V ( ), EV L is the weighted average of the CEs for the qualities A, B, 
and C using the probabilities of each quality as weights 
(3)    V V A B C ( ) ( ) 0.25 ( ) 0.50 ( ) 0.25 ( ).
C EV L EV L CE L CE L CE L = = × + × + ×  
A risk-averse participant will bid less for a lottery than the expected value, a risk-neutral 
participant will bid the expected value, and a risk-seeking participant will bid more than the 
expected value. We calculate two measures of risk aversion. First, we calculate each participant’s  
10 
risk premium for the uncategorized generic beef by subtracting his or her bid for V from the 
expected value of V: 
(4)    V ( ) (V). Risk premium EV L Bid = -  
Second, we calculate each participant’s risk ratio by dividing his or her bid for V by the 
expected value of V: 
(5)    V (V)/ ( ). Risk ratio Bid EV L =  
A risk ratio of less than one implies risk aversion, a ratio equal to one implies risk neutrality and 




Table 2 presents the mean bids and their standard deviations. Columns H1 and H2 present the 
results of the two hypothetical auction trails. Columns R1 and R2 present the results of the non-
hypothetical real trials conducted before tasting, while columns R3 and R4 present the results of 
the real trials conducted after tasting. 
As expected, participants are willing to pay more for tender beef. In R1 and R2, the mean 
bid for A was 17% higher and the mean bid for C was 24% lower than the mean bid for B. In the 
two trials after the tasting, the mean bid for A was 21% higher and the mean bid for C was 19% 
lower than the mean bid for B. Furthermore, the mean bid for A, B, and C was 31%, 12%, and –
15%, respectively, higher than the mean bid for V in R1 and R2, and 27%, 6%, and –14% higher 
in R3 and R4. All these bid differences are significantly different from zero with p values of less 
than 0.01 according to a Wilcoxon signed rank test
4. The mean bids for quality B are significantly 
higher than the mean bids for quality V, even though they have the same median tenderness.  
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Before tasting, the bid difference between B and V may partly be explained by the fact that the 
average valuation of A and C is 3.5% less than the valuation of B. However, after tasting, the 
average valuation of A and C is 1% higher than the valuation of B. 
 
Hypothetical bias? 
List and Gallet, and Murphy et al. have recently conducted meta-analyses on the observed 
disparities between hypothetical and non-hypothetical WTP found in valuation studies. Both of 
these studies find, in general, that hypothetical WTP tends to exceed real WTP. Consequently, it 
is of substantial interest to discuss the merits of our hypothetical trials. The participants did not 
bid higher in the hypothetical trials than they did in the non-hypothetical trials. In fact, they 
behaved as if the hypothetical trials were real trials and bid lower than in the following real trials. 
See List and Shogren for a discussion of rising bids in repeated Vickrey auctions. We tested if the 
average change in bids between H2 and R1 were significantly different from the average change 
in bids between H1 and H2 and between R1 and R2. Our null hypothesis is that the change from 
hypothetical to real trials has no effect on the increases in bids, or 
0 H :0.5 (H2-H1) + 0.5 (R2-R1) -(R1-H2) = 0. × ×  This hypothesis is not rejected (p = 0.97) by the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. Furthermore, none of the bid differences changed significantly from 
H2 to R1: A – B, p = 0.73; A – C, p = 0.81; A – V, p = 0.43; B – C, p = 0.79; B – V, p = 0.36; 
and C – V, p = 0.25. 
Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter suggested that people like to act consistently in 
valuation studies and our results support this view. In our auction, the participants were explicitly 
told that the two hypothetical trials would be followed by non-hypothetical trials. Given this 
framing of the hypothetical trials, participants who want to act consistently over the hypothetical  
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and non-hypothetical trials have three possible strategies. First, they can bid as if the hypothetical 
trials are real trials. Second, they can bid as if the real trials are hypothetical trials. Finally, they 
can bid something in between. Since the latter two strategies imply the cost of potentially having 
to buy a quality of beef at a price that is higher than the subjective value of this quality, the 
dominant strategy in the hypothetical trials is to bid as if the hypothetical trials are real trials. 
 
Tasting 
We randomly drew one fillet from each quality for tasting. The fillet representing quality V 
would have been categorized as very tender (quality A). Consequently, the fillet representing 
quality B was less tender than the fillet representing quality V and tasting appears to have 
affected the bidding in R3 and R4. The mean bid for qualities A, C, and V increased by NOK 
0.61 (p = 0.29), 2.67 (p = 0.12) and 0.88 (p = 0.17), respectively, from R2 to R3, whereas the 
mean bid for quality B decreased by NOK 2.84 (p = 0.23). None of these mean bids changed 
significantly between R2 and R3, although the mean bid for B was reduced compared with the 
bids for A (p = 0.06), C (p = 0.01), and V (p = 0.02). These changes indicate that the participants 
used the information obtained from tasting to update their beliefs about the four qualities, even 
though they were instructed that the loins were drawn randomly. 
 
Rising bids 
Figure 2 illustrates the rising mean bids throughout the trials. With the exception of a decline in 
the mean bid for quality B after tasting, the mean bids for all qualities are stable or rising. Rising 
bids in multi-trial auctions are one of the most persistent results in experimental valuation 
literature and are usually explained as learning effects. Framing and learning effects in multi-trial 
auctions have been studied in a number of papers (e.g., Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler; List and  
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Shogren; Shogren et al. 1994a; Shogren, List, and Hayes). List and Shogren also found some 
evidence of bids being correlated with posted prices, but concluded that most of the increase in 
bids may be explained by participants learning their optimal strategy. The only study not 
reporting increasing bids is Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler, who found that, in a ninth-price sealed-
bid auction, bids were decreasing. Their results may be explained, at least partly, by the lack of 
competition in a market where almost all participants are buyers. 
Bidding on all qualities simultaneously ensures that the rules and learning processes are 
identical for all qualities. Even though our bids are rising over the trials, the differences in bids 




We compare the expected value, calculated as described by equation (3), to the bids for quality V 
in the six trials. In the first hypothetical trial, 12 participants bid more for V than the expected 
value of V. In the following five trials, 5, 6, 9, 12 and 18 participants bid the same or more for V 
than the expected value of V. Three participants (6%) bid the same or more for V than the 
expected value of V in all real trials, 25 participants (49%) bid the same or more in some trials 
and less in other trials, and 23 participants (45%) bid less for V than the expected value of V in 
all four real trials. In the four real trials, 13 participants (25%) bid on average more for V than the 
expected value of V. For the remaining 38 participants (75%), the average bid for quality V was 
lower than the expected value of V in the four real trials. These 38 participants showed evidence 
of risk aversion and were willing to pay less for the uncategorized beef than its expected value. 
Furthermore, the results from the four real trials imply that the categorization of the beef 
increased the total value of the beef by 8%.  
14 
As shown in table 3, the mean risk premiums were positive and the mean risk ratios were 
below one in all trials. The mean risk premium in R1 and R2 was NOK 7.00 and NOK 6.44 while 
it was reduced to NOK 4.96 and NOK 3.59 in R3 and R4. As discussed above, the tasting may 
explain this reduction. The results of the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test show that the 
risk premium was statistically significant in all trials. 
The cumulative distribution of the individual risk ratios in the four real trials is presented 
in figure 3. Two participants (4%) had a risk ratio below 0.7, five participants (10%) had a risk 
ratio below 0.8, 17 participants (33%) had a risk ratio below 0.9, 38 participants (75%) had a risk 
ratio below 1, and 49 participants (96%) had a risk ratio below 1.1. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
In our experimental auction, 75% of the participants were risk averse in their choice of beef. The 
risk aversion evident suggests that consumers want to avoid inconsistencies in quality and, 
therefore, assign a negative value to uncertainty regarding tenderness. This result suggests that 
low stake but high probability risk is important in the beef market and is likely to be important in 
other markets for unprocessed or semi-processed foods such as meat, fish, fruits, and vegetables. 
  The participants were willing to pay 50% more for very tender beef and 25% more for 
tender beef compared with less tender beef. Further, the participants were not only interested in 
the average tenderness, but also the consistency of quality. On average, the bids for tenderness-
categorized beef were 8% higher than the bids for non-categorized beef with identical tenderness 
distribution. 
Currently, beef is sold as an experience good where the quality can be judged only after 
the purchase. Most beef is sold without any categorization of tenderness and beef processors have 
tended to focus on low-cost production. Labeling may transform beef from an experience good to  
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a search good for which consumers have information regarding tenderness before purchase. In 
this study, the tenderness of the beef was accurately determined. Such precise determination may 
be beyond the scope of meat processors. However, the risk can be reduced by a tracking system 
that follows the production of beef. Factors that influence the end quality can then be monitored 
and a good estimate of tenderness provided as a basis for labeling. The profitability of such a 
marketing strategy depends on whether the tracking, labeling, and segmentation costs are lower 




1 In global terms, Norway has a high organizational participation rate. In the Oslo area, for 
example, 49% of the population responds that they actively participate in at least one 
organization (Statistics Norway). Recruiting through organizations, therefore, gives a fairly 
representative sample of the population. 
2 November 14, 2003: NOK100 = US$14.31 = ￿12.20 (www.oanda.com) 
3 The WB scores for the sample fillets of A, B, C, and V were 31, 39, 58, and 32, respectively. 
4 We use this non-parametric test in all our bid comparisons.   16 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Auction Sample 
Variable  Definition     Mean
a   St.dev. 
Gender  Gender of participant    
  Male = 1; Female = 2     1.51  0.50 
Age   Age of participant    38.29  8.50 
Income   Total income of household
b     5.31  1.89 
  (in NOK 100,000) 
Education   Highest completed education    2.43  0.70 
  Elementary school = 1 
  High school = 2 
  University/college = 3 
a Corresponding figures for the population between 20 and 60 years old in the Oslo area are 
1.51, 39.80, 5.89, and 2.41, respectively, based on estimates from Statistics Norway. 




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Bids 
  Hypothetical Trials   Real Trials 
  H1  H2  R1  R2  R3  R4 
Quality A 
  Mean bid A  83.10  84.88  86.84  88.92  89.53  90.88 
  Standard deviation A  14.37  15.06  13.71  12.10  13.42  12.33 
  Price premium A
a  39%  38%  34%  33%  33%  28%  
Quality B 
  Mean bid B  69.16  72.53  73.88  76.92  74.08  75.57 
  Standard deviation B  12.67  14.01  14.24  12.25  15.06  15.03 
  Price premium B  16%  17%  13%  14%  9%  6% 
Quality C 
  Mean bid C  54.22  56.22  57.41  57.37  60.04  61.14 
  Standard deviation C  13.38  14.10  14.08  16.21  16.20  12.34 
  Price premium C  –10%  –10%  –12%  14%  –12%  –14% 
Quality V 
  Mean bid V  61.16  63.49  66.00  68.59  69.47  72.20
  Standard deviation C  13.98  12.98  12.81  13.54  14.31  14.47 
a Price premium for quality A relative to quality V, measured in percent. Price premium A = 
100*(Bid A – Bid V)/Bid V.   21 
Table 3. Preferences toward Risk 
   Hypothetical Trials       Real Trials   
  H1  H2  R1  R2  R3  R4  Mean 
Mean risk premium   7.75  8.04  7.00  6.44  4.96  3.59   5.50 
Standard deviation  10.64  7.45  7.50  7.84  9.75  10.19  6.96 
Wilcoxon test p value
a  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
 
Mean risk ratio  0.89  0.89  0.91  0.91  0.93  0.96  0.93 
Standard deviation  0.15  0.12  0.10  0.11  0.14  0.15  0.10 
 
# Risk averse  38  43  43  39  35  32  38 
# Risk neutral  1  3  2  3  4  1  0 
# Risk seeking  12  5  6  9  12  18  13 






Figure 1. Tenderness Grading 
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a The risk ratio is defined as the WTP for generic beef divided by the weighted average of the 
WTP for the three qualities of tenderness-categorized beef, with the shares used in the 
categorization as weights. 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative Distribution of the Risk Ratio
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Appendix: Instructions for Beef Experiment (translated from Norwegian for the use of 
referees) 
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in today’s session. This session is a part of a large 
research project investigating consumers’ preferences for beef. The project is conducted by 
the Agricultural University of Norway and Matforsk (The Norwegian Food Research 
Institute). The Research Council of Norway finances the project. The market study has two 
parts and will last approximately one and a half hours. The first part is a survey with some 
questions about you and your use of and experience with beef. The second part is an 
experimental beef market, where some of you will be allowed to buy beef. 
As you entered the building, you were given an identity number. You will use this id-
number to identify yourself. The id-number must be written on all papers handed in today. 
You were also given three NOK 100 vouchers with a total value of NOK 300. The vouchers 
can be exchanged for money at the end of today’s session. The price of any products you 
choose to buy will be subtracted from the NOK 300. Therefore, each of you will leave with 
NOK 300 minus the price of any product you choose to buy. After you have completed 
today’s session, you will get a short questionnaire to take home. The completed questionnaire 
must be posted by November 28. The organization that recruited you for this study will 
receive NOK 200 for each returned questionnaire. 
The participants are kindly requested not to talk with each other. If you have a 
question, please ask one of the monitors. 
Are there any questions before we begin?   24 
Product Description 
We have obtained 120 kilograms of beef sirloin fillets from Norway’s largest meat processing 
company, Norsk Kjøtt. No particular demands were made with regard to the fillets, so the 
beef reflects the quality you find in stores. 
The fillets have been tenderness tested at Matforsk, and divided into three categories. 
We have categorized the 25% most tender fillets as very tender, the 25% least tender as less 
tender, and the remaining 50% as tender. The tenderness testing was done using a Warner-
Bratsler shear force test. In this test, one measures the required force to pin through a small 
test sample of each beef fillet. After the test, all the beef fillets have been cut and packed into 
400 gram consumer packages. 
 
(Show Figure 1 Quality grading) 
 
  Based on the test, we have created four qualities of beef and labeled them A, B, C and 
V. Quality A consists of very tender beef, quality B consists of tender beef, quality C consists 
of less tender beef, and quality V consists of fillets reflecting the tenderness distribution in the 
total beef sample, 25% very tender, 50% tender, and 25% less tender. 
 
Quality A   Categorized to be among the top 25% most tender beef. 
Quality B   Categorized to be among the mid 50%. 
Quality C   Categorized to be among the bottom 25% least tender beef. 
Quality V   Not quality categorized. Can be very tender, tender, or less tender. 
   25 
Instructions Auctions 
We will use a fourth-price sealed-bid auction to auction off three packages of quality A, three 
packages of quality B, three packages of quality C, and three packages of quality V. In a 
fourth-price sealed-bid auction, the three highest bidders are allowed to buy the product for a 
price that equals the fourth-highest bid.    
  We will auction off the four qualities (A, B, C, V) in four simultaneous fourth-price 
auctions. After we have completed the auctions, we will randomly draw one of the four 
qualities as the binding quality. The three qualities not drawn as binding will not be sold. 
Thus, no one will buy more than one quality. 
  To allow you to refine your bids, we will run two training trials followed by four real 
trials. After we have completed the four real trials, we will draw one of the real trials as the 
binding trial. The training trials and the three real trials not drawn will not be binding. 
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Example 
Let us assume that participants 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 have submitted the bids 90, 80, 70, 60, and 50 
NOK, respectively, for one product. Let us further assume that these five bids are the five 
highest bids for the product, and that these bids are equal to the highest amount that the  
  Participant  Bid   
       
  1  90   
Buyers  2  80   
  3  70   
  4  60  Price 
  5  50   
 
participants are willing to pay. The fourth highest bid is NOK 60 and this will be the price. 
Participants 1, 2, and 3 have higher bids than the price and will be the buyers. Participant 4 
bid NOK 60 and is not a buyer. 
  In a fourth-price sealed-bid auction, it is in the participants’ own interest to bid the 
highest amount they are willing to pay for each of the products. What happens if participant 1 
tries to buy the product at a lower price by submitting a lower bid? If his bid is above NOK 
60, participant 1 is still a buyer and the price is still NOK 60. If the price is below NOK 60, 
then participant 1 is no longer a buyer and is not allowed to buy the product even though the 
price is below what he would be willing to pay for the product. 
  What happens if participant 5 tries to buy the product by submitting a higher bid? If 
the bid is below NOK 70, participant 5 is still not a buyer. If the bid is above NOK 70, 
participant 5 is a buyer. However, the price is now NOK 70 and higher than his valuation of 
the product.   27 
Example 2: Drawing of Binding Trial and Product 
When we have finished the four trials with four products in each trial, we have sixteen sets of 
buyers and prices. Let us assume that we have recorded the following sixteen sets. 
 
Trial  Quality A  Quality B  Quality C  Quality V 
         
1             Price  NOK 99  NOK 89  NOK 79  NOK 69 
         Buyers  3, 4, 7  1, 5, 8  4, 3, 2  1, 6, 8 
         
2             Price  NOK 89  NOK 79  NOK 69  NOK 99 
         Buyers  4, 2, 6  4, 3, 6  1, 2, 6  9, 3, 2 
                       
3             Price  NOK 79  NOK 69  NOK 99  NOK 89 
           Buyers  2, 5, 8  3, 4, 7  4, 2, 6  1, 5, 8 
         
4             Price  NOK 69  NOK 99  NOK 89  NOK 79 
         Buyers  4, 3, 6  4, 2, 6  3, 4, 7  4, 3, 6 
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We draw one product and one trial as binding. Let’s assume that product B and trial 3 is 
drawn as the binding product and the binding trial. The sixteen sets of buyers and prices are 
reduced to one binding set. In this example, we will sell 400 grams of quality B to participant 
3, 4, and 7, and the price is NOK 69 (determined by the fourth highest bid). 
 
Trial  Quality A  Quality B  Quality C  Quality V 
         
1             Price  NOK 99  NOK 89  NOK 79  NOK 69 
         Buyers  3, 4, 7  1, 5, 8  4, 3, 2  1, 6, 8 
         
2             Price  NOK 89  NOK 79  NOK 69  NOK 99 
         Buyers  4, 2, 6  4, 3, 6  1, 2, 6  9, 3, 2 
                     
3             Price  NOK 79  NOK 69  NOK 99  NOK 89 
           Buyers  2, 5, 8  3, 4, 7  4, 2, 6  1, 5, 8 
         
4             Price  NOK 69  NOK 99  NOK 89  NOK 79 
         Buyers  4, 3, 6  4, 2, 6  3, 4, 7  4, 3, 6 
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Summary Instructions 
 
1)  You are to write the highest amount that you are willing to pay for each of the four 
products on the bidding scheme. 
 
2)  The price of each product is set equal to the fourth highest bid for that product. The 
participants who have submitted higher bids will be recorded as buyers. The price 
and the id-numbers of the buyers will be written on the board after each trial. 
 
3)  After we have completed all trials, we will randomly draw one product and one 
trial as binding. The participants who have been recorded as buyers in the binding 
auction will buy a 400-gram package of beef of the respective quality and pay a 
price that is equal to the fourth highest bid in that auction. Hence, under no 
circumstances, will anyone end up buying more than one product. 
 
4)  To allow you to try the auction mechanism, we will first conduct two training 
trails. These two training trial will not be binding, and they will not be included in 
the drawing of the binding trial. 
 
Are there any questions before we begin the auction? 